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I. INTRODUCTION
Despite the failure of the 104th Congress to override President Clinton's
veto and enact the Common Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act,'
there is little doubt that such an Act will be passed by the 105th Congress.2
Uniform national laws concerning product liability are necessary, can be
* Professor of Law, Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall College of
Law. J.D., Cornell University; LL.M., New York University. The author thanks his research
assistants, Emily Hvizdos and Stacey McKinley, for their support.
I. H.R. 956, 104th Cong. (1996). H.R. 956 was approved by the Joint Conference
Committee on March 19, 1996. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-481 (1996). President Clinton
received the Conference Report bill on April 30, 1996, and vetoed it on May 2, 1996. See
John F. Harris, Clinton Vetoes Product Liability Measure, WASH. POST, May 3, 1996, at
A14; Neil A. Lewis, President Vetoes Limits on Liability, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1996, at A l;
The Lawyers' Veto, WALL ST. J., May 3, 1996, at A12. A veto override that was attempted
in the House on May 9, 1996 in order to preserve a record on the issue fell twenty-three
votes short of passage. Victor E. Schwartz & Mark A. Behrens, The Road to Federal
Product Liability Reform, 55 MD. L. REv. 1363, 1365 n.18 (1996).
For the full text of H.R. 956, see Symposium, Is H.R. 956 Really "Common Sense"?:
A Symposium on Federal Tort Reform Legislation, 64 TENN. L. REv. 557, 559-94 (1997).
2. A Bill containing essentially the same provisions as H.R. 956 has been introduced
into the Senate this term. See S. 5, 105th Cong. (1997).
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enacted consistent with Congressional authority, and should be enacted at
the earliest possible time.
A balanced Act, recognizing the need to protect injured consumers while
providing necessary protection to product manufacturers and distributors, can
be drafted. Such an Act could include provisions that abolish the consumer
expectancy test for design defect litigation, reject the product line exception
to successor corporate liability, limit industry-wide liability concepts, impose
a substance abuse defense, abolish joint and several liability in a compara-
tive responsibility allocation system, and others which would restore balance
to the field. A national product liability act should not contain a statute of
repose.
This article will address various aspects of a potential statute of repose
on the assumptions that (1) its enactment is likely, (2) it will be substantive-
ly similar to the provisions of House Bill 956 as approved by the Congress
in March 1996, and (3) it will have preemptive effect. For purposes of this
article the language of House Bill 956, Section 106, as enrolled, will be
utilized.3
There is no compelling need for a national statute of repose.4 The
number of potential claims affected is too small to justify the draconian
effect of a repose statute.5 This is all the more true in light of the Act's
exclusion of a substantial body of potential claims, including: all toxic tort
claims which would be governed by the two year statute of limitations and
3. H.R. 956, 104th Cong. § 106(b) (1996) provides:
(b) Statute of Repose.-
(1) In general.-Subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), no product liability action that is
subject to this Act concerning a product, that is a durable good, alleged to have caused
harm (other than toxic harm) may be filed after the 15-year period beginning at the time
of delivery of the product to the first purchaser or lessee.
(2) State law.-Notwithstanding paragraph (I), if pursuant to an applicable State law,
an action described in such paragraph is required to be filed during a period that is
shorter than the 15-year period specified in such paragraph, the State law shall apply
with respect to such period.
(3) Exceptions.-
(A) A motor vehicle, vessel, aircraft, or train, that is used primarily to transport
passengers for hire, shall not be subject to this subsection.
(B) Paragraph (1) does not bar a product liability action against a defendant who
made an express warranty in writing as to the safety or life expectancy of the specific
product involved which was longer than 15 years, but it will apply at the expiration of
that warranty.
(C) Paragraph (1) does not affect the limitations period established by the General
Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (49 U.S.C. § 40101 note).
4. For a recent discussion refuting the various arguments in favor of a national
products liability statute of repose, see Stephen J. Werber, The Constitutional Dimension of
A National Products Liability Statute of Repose, 40 VILL. L. REV. 986, 1031-52 (1995).
5. Id. at 1032.
[Vol. 64:763
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discovery rule of Section 106(a) 6; motor vehicles, vessels, aircraft, and
trains used primarily to transport passengers for hire;7 all non-durable
goods;8 and aircraft governed by the General Aviation Revitalization Act.9
The lack of need bears directly upon the questionable constitutionality of
such a statute. Courts continue to grapple with constitutional issues when
determining whether to uphold and apply a repose statute so as to preclude
a cause of action before injury occurs or where knowledge of the relation-
ship between injury and product did not exist within the statutory period.
II. RECENT DECISIONS
One of the most comprehensive recent decisions is Cummings v. X-Ray
Associates of New Mexico. ' ° This state court decision applied federal
constitutional law to uphold a rigid three-year medical malpractice statute
of repose against claims that it violated equal protection and due process
mandates." The court's due process reasoning could apply with equal
force to a product liability statute.'2 The distinctions between repose
statutes and statutes of limitations was recognized in fairly traditional terms:
A statute of limitations establishes the time, after a cause of action
arises, within which a claim must be filed. A statute of limitations begins
to run when the cause of action accrues, the accrual date usually being the
date of discovery.... On the other hand, a statute of repose terminates
the right to any action after a specific time has elapsed, even though no
injury has yet manifested itself.'3
Plaintiff asserted that her due process rights were violated because the
statute denied her fundamental right of access to the courts.' 4 By rejecting
6. H.R. 956, 104th Cong. § 106(b)(1). This will most likely include harm caused
by various chemical or mineral products, such as asbestos or polyvinyl chloride, and a
substantial number of pharmaceuticals which can cause delayed onset toxic harm.
7. Id. § 106(b)(3)(A).
8. Id. § 106(b)(1). The repose provision applies only to durable goods as
ambiguously defined in Section 101(7).
9. Id. § 106(b)(3)(C), which incorporates 49 U.S.C. § 40101, Historical and
Statutory Notes, General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-298, 108 Stat.
1552 (codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101-40120 (1994)). Section 2 of that Act provides for an
18 year repose period for certain aircraft manufacturers and suppliers when specified
conditions apply.
10. 918 P.2d 1321 (N.M. 1996).
11. Id. at 1331.
12. As the nature of the classifications involved in this case are distinct from those
made in product liability cases, that portion of the decision, utilizing a rational basis standard,
has only limited application to a product liability repose statute.
13. Id. at 1334.
14. Id. at 1331.
1997]
HeinOnline  -- 64 Tenn. L. Rev. 765 1996-1997
TENNESSEE LA W REVIEW
the claim that a fundamental right was involved, the court was able to apply
a rational basis standard instead of strict scrutiny. 5 Despite its recognition
that statutes of limitations differ from statutes of repose, the court utilized
standard limitation period arguments to reject the due process claim. It
ruled that regardless of reason, limitation periods always preclude persons
from bringing claims and that this does not implicate due process. 6
Moreover, the statute does not address an accrued or vested right that has
been taken away. Rather, the claim is an attempt to gain something not yet
possessed-compensation for injury. Posed differently, there is no cause of
action because, under such a statute, it never comes into existence. Hence,
there can be no due process violation.' 7
The court's reasoning in Cummings ignores the meaningful differences
it recognized between a limitation period and a repose period. In a
limitations situation the injured party knows, or has the capacity to know,
that a claim exists. This is not true of a repose statute. The rationale of no
cause of action accruing is usually applicable to the commencement period
for statutory wrongful death actions rather than common law personal injury
actions. That form of reasoning is better left to statutory claims.
The Sixth Circuit recently faced statute of repose issues pursuant to
Tennessee law and to Ohio law. In both cases the court adhered to the
decisions of the state court without engaging in its own analysis. As the
federal court is not bound by the state interpretation of federal constitutional
law, this deference was unnecessary. One result of this overly restrictive
approach is the continuation of a conflict between the states.
In Hayes v. General Motors Corp.,' 8 the court ruled that no violation
of the Tennessee Constitution existed in the application of that state's
product liability repose statute and further found no reason to revisit any
federal questions.' 9 An opposite result was reached in Schaffer v. A. 0.
Smith Harverstore Products, Inc.20 In Schaffer, the decedents drowned in
15. Id. The court distinguished between the right of access in civil and criminal
settings. Id. at 1331-32.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1331.
18. No. 95-5713, 1996 WL 452916 (6th Cir. Aug. 8, 1996).
19. Id.
20. 74 F.3d 722 (6th Cir. 1996). The Eleventh Circuit has also been faced with
application of a state product liability repose statute previously deemed unconstitutional by
a state supreme court and confusion engendered by that state's law. The Eleventh Circuit
certified questions to the Florida Supreme Court. Mosher v. Speedstar Div. of AMCA Int'l,
Inc., 52 F.3d 913 (11 th Cir. 1995). The answers came in Mosher v. SpeedstarDivision of
AMCA International, Inc., 675 So. 2d 918 (Fla. 1996), in which the state supreme court
clarified its rule as to a "reliance exception" to protect those who relied on Battilla v. Allis
Chalmers Manufacturing Co., 392 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 1980) (holding the Florida product
liability repose statute invalid as a violation of the state's right of access provision), and did
not file their claims until after the repose statute had run. Mosher, 675 So. 2d at 920-21.
[Vol. 64:763
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a manure pit which was part of an integrated manure handling system. 2'
After determining that the pit was within the definition of an improvement
to real property, the court had to determine whether the applicable statute
of repose was constitutional.22 The court avoided an analysis of the federal
constitutional question. The district court finding was reversed only because
the Ohio Supreme Court found the repose statute to be in violation of the
Ohio Constitution's right to remedy provision. 3
III. GENERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS
Whether a preemptive national repose statute can withstand constitution-
al scrutiny remains an open question. To answer the question requires
consideration of three distinct lines of argument: equal protection, due
process,24 and right to remedy or access to the courts (otherwise known as
an "open courts" right). The open courts right, if it exists under federal
constitutional law, exists as an independent right.25
There is no doubt as to the weight to be given a federal statute.
Pursuant to the Supremacy Clause, 26 a national Product Liability Act
enacted within the scope of the Commerce Clause 27 will govern all actions
The issue required clarification as the court receded from Battilla and upheld the statute in
question. Id. at 920. The Florida Legislature repealed the statute in 1986. Id.
21. Schajfer, 74 F.3d at 725.
22. Id. at 728.
23. Id. (citing Brennaman v. R.M.I. Co., 639 N.E.2d 425,430, opinion amended, 643
N.E.2d 138 (Ohio 1994), and its application of OHIO CONST. art. I, § 16). Summary
judgment for the defendants was affirmed on other grounds.
24. Despitethe significant use of due process reasoning in medical malpractice repose
cases, see, e.g., Garcia v. La Farge, 893 P.2d 428, 435-38 (N.M. 1995); Gaines v. Preterm-
Cleveland, Inc., 514 N.E.2d 709, 715-17 (Ohio 1987), nothing has changed the fact that the
Supreme Court has not used due process to invalidate social or economic regulatory laws
since 1937. D. Don Welch, Legitimate Government Purposes and State Enforcement of
Morality, 1993 U. ILL. L. REv. 67, 72 (1993). The primary vehicle for constitutional
analysis of product liability statutes of repose has been equal protection. In light of this fact
and because the likelihood of a successful equal protection claim outweighs that of a due
process argument, extensive discussion of due process will not be provided.
25. Cummings correctly states that access to the courts "is not a due-process question
applicable to one who, as with all others similarly situated, has no recognized cause of action
by reason of a valid statute of repose." Cummings, 918 P.2d at 133 1. Though the reasoning
may be doubtful, the conclusion is proper--due process and open courts are distinct concepts.
26. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. For a discussion of specific preemption concerns, see
infra notes 79-110 and accompanying text.
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The obvious connection between products and
interstate commerce, supported in both testimony before the Congress and in H.R. 956's
statement of purpose and findings, see Werber. supra note 4, at 1001-02, negates any concern
that Congress has overstepped the bounds of the Commerce Clause as found in United States
v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
1997]
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within its purview. Its validity will be governed by federal constitutional
law in lieu of any state constitutional provisions. Ultimately, federal rather
than state courts will determine the proper bounds of constitutional analysis.
The initial question regarding federal constitutional review will be the
applicable standard. A repose statute will most likely be reviewed under the
liberal and usually ineffectual rational basis test. The requisite suspect class
or fundamental right necessary to activate strict scrutiny is not present. -8
The absence of both gender and illegitimacy concerns makes it unlikely that
an intermediate standard of review will be applied. With rare exception,
federal and state courts have applied rational basis to ascertain the validity
of statutes of repose.30  This test calls only for a determination that the
legislation have a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose.
Rational basis analysis, an approach and principle designed to provide
substantial deference to the legislative body, provides a standard which
generally yields a conclusion validating the legislation under consideration.
This is equally true of equal protection and due process clause applications.
For example, when the Colorado repose statute was upheld in Eaton v.
Jarvis Products Corp.," the court found no invidious discrimination and
based its decision on the absence of a fundamental right.3 - Such a statute
must be upheld if any set of facts can reasonably justify it regardless of the
existence of some statutory discrimination. The classification protected
some manufacturers against open-ended liability for equipment that would
typically reveal defects before the statutory period ran. The court refused
to recognize the elimination of a tort action prior to its accrual as anything
28. Cf Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995) (holding that racial classifications
warrant the use of strict scrutiny); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena. 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2106-
08 (1995); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). But
see Kenyon v. Hammer, 688 P.2d 961, 970-71 (Ariz. 1984) (en banc) (applying strict
scrutiny to a medical malpractice repose statute).
29. In such cases the statute under review must be predicated on an "exceedingly
persuasive justification." See. e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex re T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1425
(1994); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982). Intermediate
scrutiny has been applied under state law to invalidate a product liability repose statute on
equal protection grounds. Hanson v. Williams County, 389 N.W.2d 319, 325, 328 (N.D.
1986) (citing Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 464 A.2d 288, 294 (N.H. 1983)).
30. See Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, ValiditY and Construction of Statute Terminating
Right of Action .for Product-Caused hjury at Fixed Period After Manuiacture, Sale, or
Deliver,, 25 A.L.R.4th 641 §§ 3-6 (1983 & Supp. 1995) (summarizing more than thirty
decisions).
31. 965 F.2d 922 (10th Cir. 1992) (reviewing COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-80-107
(West 1987)); accord Hayes v. General Motors Corp., 1996 WL 452916 (6th Cir. 1996)
(discussedsupra note 18); Kochins v. Linden-Alimak, Inc., 799 F.2d 1128 (6th Cir, 1986).
The Kochins decision came very close to an actual consideration of the purported reasons in
support of the Tennessee statute before yielding to the norm and passively upholding it.
32. Eaton, 965 F.2d at 930-31.
[Vol. 64:763
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like a fundamental right and provided no real basis to support its contention
that most defects would be revealed prior to the end of the statutory period.
Under rational basis there was no mandate for the court to truly explore the
factual predicates. As this standard of review also precludes the court from
second guessing the wisdom or logic of a given legislative action,33 the
actual scrutiny is so limited as to be almost farcical.
Despite occasional forays into a true determination of whether a statute
advances a legitimate government interest,34 the courts generally fail to
provide a true "in fact" approach to rational basis decision-making. To be
a meaningful test, rational basis must demand that there be a true relation-
ship between the classification and the governmental interest which
promotes that interest. This approach is consistent with the principles of
law enunciated by the United States Supreme Court.35
Though not utilizing "in fact" language, the plurality opinion in Adarand
Constructors v. Pena36 recognized that evaluation of rational basis asser-
tions was a judicial function.37 A more explicit fact-based analysis was
utilized to find an absence of an interstate commerce connection in United
States v. Lopez. 38 Based upon its independent evaluation of the facts, the
33. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993). Similar principles apply at the state
level. See, e.g., State ex rel Bishop v. Board of Educ., 40 N.E.2d 913, 919 (Ohio 1942).
34. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982) (a combination of six
Justices, two in concurring opinions, applied rational basis to invalidate a state employment
practice that denied a party the right to a hearing); United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno,
413 U.S. 528, 534 (1933) (rejecting a classification made by the Food Stamp Act as unrelated
to the purposes of the Act).
35. See generally, Logan, 455 U.S. at 439 (stating that "the classificatory scheme
must 'rationally advanc[e] a reasonable and identifiable governmental objective"' (citations
omitted)). Recognition that rational basis analysis is not toothless was also recognized in
decisions such as Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1975) (upholding a Social Security
Act provision regarding surviving child benefits), but recognizingJinenezv. Weinberger,417
U.S. 628 (1974) (which did not use the term "toothless," but which voided a provision of the
Social Security Act regulating disability insurance for illegitimate children). In Jimenez,the
need for a true relationship between the law and its basis was emphasized in the Court's
reasoning that:
We recognize that the prevention of spurious claims is a legitimate govern-
mental interest and that dependency of illegitimates in appellant's subclass, as
defined under the federal statute, has not been legally established .... As we
have noted, the Secretary maintains that the possibility that evidence of
parentage or support may be fabricated is greater when the child is not born
until after the wage earner has become entitled to benefits. It does not follow,
however, that the blanket and conclusive exclusion of appellant's subclass of
illegitimates is reasonably related to the prevention of spurious claims.
Id. at 636.
36. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
37. Id. at 2112-13.
38. 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1634 (1995).
1997]
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Court concluded that the firearms provision under consideration had no
rational basis and connection to interstate commerce regardless of what
Congress asserted.39 Justice Kennedy, in an important concurring opinion,
provides a realistic analysis of the duties imposed upon the political
branches of government:
[i]t would be mistaken and mischievous for the political branches to
forget that the sworn obligation to preserve and protect the Constitution in
maintaining the federal balance is their own in the first and primary
instance. . . . [S]ome Congresses have accepted responsibility to confront
the great questions of the proper federal balance in terms of lasting
consequences for the constitutional design. The political branches of the
Government must fulfill this grave constitutional obligation if democratic
liberty and the federalism that secures it are to endure.4"
When Congress fails to heed this obligation, the Court must step in to
assure that Congress has acted in a constitutional manner. Any less
assertive approach would allow Congress to become not only the enactor of
statutes, but also the arbiter of their validity. This abdication of judicial
prerogative must not be tolerated. Absent true judicial review, rational basis
analysis "virtually immunizes social and economic legislative classifications
from judicial review."' Appropriate rational basis analysis, however
unlikely, should void a product liability repose statute.
The majority of reasons proffered by Congress for enactment of product
liability reform apply with equal force to other elements of the civil justice
system. Product liability concerns are no different from other tort concerns
in regard to abuse of the civil justice system, a litigious nation, arbitrary
damage awards and liability allocations, inconsistent laws among the several
states, state inability to solve these problems, the need to remove barriers to
interstate commerce, and the need to restore fairness to the system.42 The
remaining reasons arguably justify the unique treatment given to product
liability litigation. These reasons are: (1) withdrawal of products from the
marketplace;" (2) an adverse impact upon industry and small business; (3)
39. Id. at 1629 n.2.
40. Id. at 1639 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
41. United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 183 (1980) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
42. These are seven of the eleven reasons specified in H.R. 956, 104th Cong. § 2(a)-
(b) (1996) (Findings and Purposes section).
43. It does not appear that, a significant number of products have been withdrawn.
The American consumer has not suffered a significant loss of products although there has
been a reduction of manufacturers in areas such as pharmaceuticals and sports equipment.
In 1983 the Physicians Desk Reference, at 204 and 211, listed eight manufacturers of
injectable anesthetics and four manufacturers of Biological Live Vaccines. These numbers
were reduced to six and three respectively in the 1996 Physicians Desk Reference at 204 and
208. The reduction of companies engaged in the manufacture of sports helmets is more
[Vol. 64:763
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loss of a competitive position in the international market; and (4) increased
insurance costs. The justification is valid only if there is a factual
connection between the assertions and reality. Moreover, the relationship
of a statute of repose to any of these reasons is distinctly remote in
comparison to other provisions of national legislation.
A common law right to recover for harm caused by defective products
did not evolve as the brainchild of Justice Traynor in 1944 or the American
Law Institute in the early 1960s; rather, its roots are more than a century
old.4 The right to bring such an action is more than a newly developed
economic right or privilege. To foreclose those injured by products from
their common law right to compensation, while leaving all other tort
plaintiffs free to bring suits within the time frame of a traditional statute of
limitations, is unjustifiable and violates the equal protection clause.
The statute of repose provision in the Product Liability Reform Act
distinguishes persons injured by defective products from persons injured by
any other forms of tort-based conduct.45 Recognition of the unique aspects
of product liability litigation predicated on this distinction, such as a non-
461 bconduct based liability theory, may be justifiable. The statute of repose
provision also distinguishes persons injured by a product within a fifteen
year period from those injured by the identical product in the identical way
at a later time.47
Nothing suggests that fifteen years of use indicates that a product is not
defective or even reasonably safe. The opposite is at least equally true. For
example, product based punch press litigation is common. Such machines
are durable goods within the purview of the repose statute.48 Punch press
injuries can arise from machines that are one day old, as well as from
striking. In February, 1985, eight companies advertised helmets in Athletic business, a
leading journal for the sporting goods industry, ATHLETIC. Bus., Feb. 1985, at 51, compared
to only three such companies in February, 1997, ATHLETIC Bus., Feb. 1996, at 157. One
new company entered the business while six, including such leading companies as Bike
Athletic Co. and Rawlings Sporting Goods Co., abandoned this portion of their business.
Some of this loss, which might otherwise reflect antitrust concerns, can be attributed to
product liability law. Detrimental market effect upon products such as DES, the Dalkon
Shield, and asbestos were merited. One product line that was lost, which should not have
been, was the General Motors Corvair automobile which contained many positive design
features.
44. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944) (including Justice
Traynor's concurring opinion at 440-43, and cases cited therein).
45. H.R. 956, 104th Cong. § 101(9),(14),(15) (1996).
46. Such a standard is unrealistic. Strict liability theory, even with a consumer
expectancy definition of defect, cannot avoid conduct concerns. The proposed RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (Proposed Final Draft, April 1, 1997) defines
design defect only in terms of risk/benefit analysis which is markedly conduct conscious.
47. H.R. 956, 104th Cong. § 106 (1996).
48. Id. § 101(7).
1997]
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machines that are fifty years old. If a machine causes harm every year of
the first fifteen years of its use life, suit for each injury is possible.
However, if that same machine continues to cause the same kind of harm
over the next fifteen years, the statute of repose permits no relief. Product
safety is obviously not a factor in the congressional analysis. If a repose
statute is to be upheld, it must be for other reasons.
Evidence to support the claim that a repose statute will somehow reduce
insurance rates and make insurance more available to small businesses is
lacking. Similarly, there is a paucity of evidence to support the claim that
product liability litigation, no less the small fraction of it concerning
products over fifteen years of age, is somehow the cause of a litigation
explosion. Finally, foreign manufacturers are as amenable to state product
liability laws as are American manufacturers. Any past factual support for
these claims no longer exists.49
A recently published study provides data which illustrates flaws in the
purported reasoning of these "factual" justifications.5" Of the almost
250,000 civil cases commenced in the United States District Courts during
the 12-month period ending September 30, 1995, only 11% (22,288) were
product liability personal injury actions.5' Based on analysis of 75 large
counties, it appears that only 3% of state court civil actions filed in 1992
were product liability cases, and only 3% of those cases were tried by
juries.52 The report also notes that studies "suggest that the direct costs of
product liability represent a small share of the value added for most
manufacturing firms (less than 1%) even in reputed high exposure
sectors."53  The data regarding the extent of product liability litigation
49. These predicates for Congressional action are discussed in Werber, supra note 4,
at 1033-52. As noted therein, data and scholarly research suggest that there is neither an
insurance crisis nor a litigation explosion. See. e.g., INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE OF PROD.
LIAB., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FINAL REPORT (1977); Theodore Eisenberg & James A.
Henderson, Jr., hIside The Quiet Revolution in Products Liability, 39 UCLA L. REv. 731
(1992); Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of* the Tort
LitigationSvsteln-AndWhY Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147 (1992); Jerry J. Phillips. Attacks
on the Legal System-Fallacvof 'Tort Reform'Arguments, TRIAL, Feb. 1992, at 106.
Although all such data is subject to a degree of manipulation and is no better than the
base from which it is drawn, the totality of the evidence is overwhelming: There is no
product liability based litigation explosion and there is insufficient data to support a claim
that a product liability repose statute will reduce insurance rates.
50. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, AN AGENDA FOR JUSTICE: ABA PERSPECTIVES ON
CRIMINAL AND CIVIL JUSTICE ISSUES (1996).
51. Id. at 99 (citing ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS,
JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS (1995).
52. Id. (citing BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., NCJ-154346, CIVIL
JUSTICE SURVEY OF STATE COURTS (1992)).
53. Id. (citing GEORGE EADS & P. REUTER, RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE,
DESIGNING SAFER PRODUCTS: CORPORATE RESPONSES TO PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW AND
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make clear that any "litigation explosion" cannot be attributed to product
liability actions. 4 It is also difficult to support the claim that a small
percentage increase in manufacturing costs can have a significant effect on
product development or international trade. Indeed, this small manufactur-
ing cost increase may be less than the costs prevented through injury
reduction.
Application of realistic rational basis analysis to the repose statute leaves
no doubt as to the proper constitutional outcome. This classification, which
addresses a small fraction of the potential product liability claims,55 has no
REGULATION (1983); P. REUTER, RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, ECONOMIC
CONSEQUENCES OF EXPANDED CORPORATE LIABILITY: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY (1988)).
This author's experience with several major manufacturers suggests that the 1% figure is
overly conservative.
54. The role of tort litigation as a factor in court congestion is limited. See id. at 92-
94.
55. The repose statute exempts toxic tort-based litigation from its scope even though
this is one of the most substantial of all product liability injury areas as it involves drugs,
cigarettes, asbestos, chemicals, and similar products, possibly including silicon implants.
Asbestos, silicon implant, and tobacco claims are major sources of product liability litigation.
Recent developments exemplify the nationwide significance of such claims. For asbestos
related claims, see, e.g., Richards v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 25 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. 103
(BNA) (Cal. 1997) (precluding allocation of fault-based on claim that mesothelioma was
related to tobacco); Ballard v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 25 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep.
103 (BNA) (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1997) (jury award of 31 million dollars in punitive damages after
a prior award of 1.8 million dollars compensatory damages-the award may be reduced by
operation of law); Georgine v. Amchem, 24 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 626 (3d Cir.),
cert. granted sub nom. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 379 (1996) (propriety
of a 1.3 billion dollar settlement for future personal injury claims). For silicon implant-
related claims, see, e.g., In re Dow Coming Corp. 24 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. 373 (BNA)
(6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied sub nom. Committee of Tort Claimants v. Dow Coming Corp.,
25 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. 35 (BNA) (Jan. 6, 1997) (permitting claims against Dow
Coming's parent company and other defendants to be transferred to a Michigan District
Court); In re Dow Corning Corp., Debtor, 25 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. 49 (BNA) (U.S.
Bankr. Ct., E.D. Mich.) (motion filed for a reorganization plan funded by an initial payment
of 1.75 billion dollars and subsequent contributions). For tobacco-related claims, see, e.g.,
Vacco v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 25 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. 107 (BNA) (N.Y. S. Ct. 1997)
(New York became the 22nd state to file an action seeking compensation for health care
costs); McCone v. American Tobacco Co., 25 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. 152 (W. Va. Cir.
Ct. 1997) (class action by West Virginia smokers based on nicotine addiction). A litigation
explosion may well result from the March 1997 settlement entered into by the Liggett Group,
Inc. in which it admits the addictive and carcinogenic effects of tobacco. Moore v. American
Tobacco Co., 25 Prod. Liab. & Safety Rep. 267 (BNA) (No. 94-1429, Miss. Ch. Ct., March
20, 1997).
Other more limited exemptions further reduce the effect of the repose provision.
Moreover, the vast majority of product-related injuries, related to products within the statute,
occur well before the expiration of fifteen years. An Insurance Services Office Survey
indicated that over 97% of product-related accidents occur within six years of product
purchase. See Lankford v. Sullivan, Long & Hagerty, 416 So. 2d 996, 1002 (Ala. 1982).
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realistic relationship to any of the Congressional purposes. The repose
provision does not and cannot have any significant effect upon case filings,
insurance rates, international competitiveness, business development, or any
other legitimate objective of national product liability reform. Nevertheless,
it is safer to predict that the Supreme Court will uphold a repose statute on
these grounds than to predict that it will find a violation of equal protection
or due process.
IV. OPEN COURTS
It is equally unlikely that the Court would utilize an open courts
approach to void the repose statute. The United States Constitution lacks
a clause of this type and there is no indication that the current Court
membership would take the "activist" role needed to create such a right. It
is fairly clear that no such right presently exists.56 On the other hand, a
legitimate argument can be made that precedent allows the Court to
recognize an open courts right and to utilize that right to void a repose
statute.57 To do so would require the Court to pull together strands from
three distinct areas: 1) existing decisional law with open courts language;
2) the penumbra of the Bill of Rights; and 3) policy concerns, stated and
unstated, which led to the steady expansion of in personam jurisdiction since
the demise of Pennoyer v. Neff." Collectively, these disparate factors
provide sufficient grounds for courts to recognize an open courts right
within the United States Constitution, thereby ensuring that injured parties
have their day in court.
A. Precedential Language
The potential for a federally recognized open courts right begins with
the language, though not the holding, of Marburv v. Madison." In
Marbury, Chief Justice Marshall recognized that every individual possesses
the right to claim protection of the law when injured.6" This statement
was, however, made in a context quite distinct from modem concepts of
56. See Werber, supra note 4, at 1005-15.
57. At least 39 states have some form of open courts provision. David Schuman, The
Right to a Remedy, 65 TEMP. L.Q. 1197, 1198 n.5, 1201-02 (1992). The most often used
means to void a statute of repose, whether independently or in conjunction with other
constitutional mandates, is an open courts provision. See. e.g., Lankford v. Sullivan, Long
& Hagerty, 416 So. 2d 996 (Ala. 1982); Hazine v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 861 P.2d 625,
630 (Ariz. 1993); Heath, 464 A.2d at 296; Brennaman, 639 N.E.2d at 430; Kennedy v.
Cumberland Eng'g Co., 471 A.2d 195, 200-01 (R.I. 1984); Daugaard v. Baltic Coop. Bldg.
Supply Ass'n, 349 N.W.2d 419, 427 (S.D. 1984); Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d
670, 674-83 (Utah 1985).
58. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
59. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
60. Id. at 162-63.
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product liability and repose statutes. It remains a statement of policy or
theory waiting, perhaps, for a modem application. Equally strong language
was used by the Supreme Court in a case far closer to the current question
than was considered in Marbury. In Wilson v. Iseminger,6" the Court
reviewed a state statute that imposed a twenty-one year statute of repose
upon claims applicable to various charges against realty. The statute
contained a savings clause stating that it was not to take effect until three
years after its date of passage.62 The Court, which recognized and upheld
the repose aspect of the statute, reasoned:
Every government is under obligation to its citizens to afford them all
needful legal remedies; but it is not bound to keep its courts open indefi-
nitely for one who neglects or refuses to apply for redress until it may
fairly be presumed that the means by which the other party might disprove
his claim are lost in the lapse of time.63
The repose statute closes the door without regard to whether the injured
party has neglected or refused to apply for redress. It mandates that the
capacity to seek such redress ends before it begins. The Wilson analysis
recognizes the traditional statute of limitations rationale for such a rule: the
loss of evidence that would allow the defense to refute the claim. This
reason has limited, if any, current validity due to advances in technology
and recordkeeping methodology available even to small businesses. Product
manufacturers can most certainly retain all records pertaining to research and
development, design, manufacture, and sale of their products. These records
could be used in court with full explanatory testimony consistent with the
business records exception to the hearsay rule.64
A potential flaw in reasoning that Wilson supports an open courts right
is that the decision also declared that parties to a contract have "no more a
vested interest in the time for the commencement of an action than they
have in the form of the action to be commenced; . . . it is well settled that
the legislature may change [statutes of limitations] at its discretion, provided
adequate means of enforcing the right remain."65 This generally recog-
nized rule of law, applicable to the shortening of a statutory period, has no
relevance to the abolition of a cause of action.
The repose statute does not provide for an adequate means to enforce
the right. Even with the limited exceptions specified in Section 106, in
most cases the right is gone with the passage of time. Nevertheless, the
61. 185 U.S. 55 (1902).
62. Id. at 56.
63. Id. at 62.
64. FED. R. EvID. 803(6).
65. Wilson, 185 U.S. at 63; cf Brennaman, 639 N.E.2d at 430 (holding that a repose
statute violated the Ohio Constitution which, at a minimum, "requires that [an injured party]
have a reasonable time to enter the courthouse to seek compensation").
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theoretical claim that there is no vested right in a cause of action may defeat
an extension of Wilson into a true open courts right.
66
The potential for a broader federal open courts right is even more
confused by virtue of the Court's recent decision in M.L.B. v. S.L.J.6 7 This
decision, recognizing both equal protection and due process concerns,
ordered that the state pay for a transcript necessary to perfect an appeal from
a decree terminating parental rights.6" The Court relied upon the well-
established line of cases involving access to court decisions in the criminal
law context69 as well as a narrower line of cases mandating fee waivers to
guarantee court access and appellate rights to civil litigants in regard to
divorce, paternity, and parental status matters.7" The M.L.B. opinion
makes clear that the constitutional right of access in civil actions is
exceptional and that such a right has been denied in a wide range of cases
such as United States v. Kras.7'
The Court has distinguished between what it perceives to be matters of
fundamental concern to the family, in which the right can be recognized,
and matters of economic or social welfare in which the right has been
denied. In a very real sense the loss of access to the courts to seek
compensation for injury caused by a product defect is closer to "state
controls or intrusions on family relationships 7 2 than to an economic or
social welfare concern.
66. Such a conclusion is consistent with decisions that have either narrowly
circumscribed Marburor rejected an opportunity to recognize an open court right. See, e.g.,
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992) (indicating that the remedy
language of Marbur. must be narrowly circumscribed); Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491
U.S. 701, 735 (1989) (refusing to expand the remedy provision of 42 U.S.C. § 1981); cf
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 66, 76 (1992) (finding an implied right
to damages for a Title IX violation relying, in part, on the remedy language of Marbur).
67. 117 S. Ct. 555 (1996).
68. Id. at 570.
69. Id. at 565-66; see, e.g., Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971) (free transcripts
for indigent appellants charged with petty offenses); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)
(indigent's right to transcript to perfect an appeal); see also Bounds v. Smith. 430 U.S. 817,
821 (1977) (requiring that prisoners have access to law library or adequate legal assistance
and noting that "it is now established beyond doubt that prisoners have a constitutional right
of access to the courts"). The degree to which Bounds will remain fully viable is question-
able. See Lewis v. Casey, 116 S. Ct. 2174 (1996) (narrowly defining the "right of access"
acknowledged in Bounds).
70. See Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981) (allowing a party to be denied redress
in a bankruptcy action because of the party's inability to pay filing fees); Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971) (prohibiting a State from denying access to its courts
to a party seeking a divorce solely because of the party's inability to pay filing fees).
71. 409 U.S. 434 (1973) (filing fee for bankruptcy).
72. M.LB., 117 S. Ct. at 564.
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The destruction wrought upon a family when any member of that family
is injured can be devastating on many levels. For example, paraplegia,
quadriplegia, coma, or other brain damage can be as destructive to a family
as divorce or loss of parental rights. Product-related death terminates family
relationships more certainly than a judicial decree. A product liability action
may compensate for economic loss arising from such harm and, therefore,
enable family relationships to continue. This approach recognizes that
compensation addresses family concerns rather than the more limited view
that its effect is limited to economic matters. A statute of repose arbitrarily
denies this compensation to those families whose harm is sustained by a
product more than fifteen years old. Whether viewed as a mandate of due
process or of equal protection,73 the result should be the same. Either
yields a recognized open courts or right of access component. The statute
of repose should fall. It is time to recognize that the Court's rule against an
open courts provision is so riddled with exceptions and so devoid of fairness
that the "exceptions" should become the rule.
74
This conclusion is substantiated not only on policy grounds but also
because doing so will advance other constitutional mandates or objectives.
An open courts right can also be recognized by utilization of the penumbra
concept which supported development of the constitutional right of
privacy.7 It can also be drawn from the policies which undergird the
expansion of in personam due process concepts.
B. The Penumbra
The Supreme Court "has never held that the Bill of Rights or the
Fourteenth Amendment protects only those rights that the Constitution
specifically mentions by name."76 The majority in the seminal decision of
Griswold v. Connecticut77 recognized that a wide variety of rights were
assured by applications and interpretations of the First, Fourth, and Fifth
Amendments.78 The Griswold majority also reiterated the important
73. The better approach may be that of due process. See id. at 570 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring); see also Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
74. In a recent decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals and held that plaintiffs had standing to bring suit as a "person" within the meaning
of the Endangered Species Act of 1973. Bennett v. Spear, 65 U.S.L.W. 4201 (U.S. March
19, 1997). The holding allowed the plaintiffs access to the courts for a complaint asserting
that the Secretary of the Interior had overenforced a section of that Act.
75. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (qualified right to abortion within the
constitutional right of privacy despite absence of express constitutional provision); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (marital privacy encompassed in the penumbra of Bill
of Rights guarantees).
76. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486-87 n. I (Goldberg, J., concurring).
77. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
78. Id. at 484.
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principle of the Ninth Amendment that "[tfhe enumeration ... of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people., 79  Thus, case law suggests, and so found in Griswold, "that
specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by
emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance."8
Although concerned with the right to privacy, the decisions relied upon to
support this right were far more broadly based,
The Bill of Rights, Seventh Amendment, provides:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United
States, than according to the rules of the common law.8
A product liability action is a common law tort action within the
purview of the Seventh Amendment. The Seventh Amendment, in turn,
makes the establishment of the judiciary and its powers as set forth in
Article III more meaningful. The Constitution creates a judiciary with
authority to determine "all Cases, in Law and Equity"- 2 and provides the
judicial branch with the authority to hear the claims of aggrieved parties.83
The Seventh Amendment adds the right to a trial by jury.84 These rights,
which encompass product liability actions, are rendered nugatory through a
statute of repose. Unless one extends the claim that the right does not come
into existence and that, therefore, due process and equal protection concerns
are irrelevant, it is impossible to rationally deny the right of access to the
court. Indeed, the equivalent right to trial by jury found in the Ohio
Constitution has been recognized as a fundamental right.85
To be meaningful-to give "life and substance" to the Seventh Amend-
ment-its emanations and penumbra must be recognized. This will
guarantee that injured parties, given the right to trial by jury, retain that
right for at least a reasonable time after they have sustained injury. To hold
79. Id. In Roe v. Wade, the Court reiterated that the right of privacy existed despite
the absence of an explicit right in the Constitution and recognized that the right, "whether
it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions
upon state actions, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth
Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough [to allow termination of
pregnancy.]" Roe. 410 U.S. at 153.
80. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
81. U.S. CONST. amend VII.
82. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Galayda v. Lake Hosp. Sys., 644 N.E.2d 298, 301 (Ohio 1994) (citing Sorrell v.
Thevenir, 633 N.E.2d 504 (Ohio 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 57 (1995)). The provisions
of the Ohio Constitution may be stronger than the Seventh Amendment as it mandates that
the right to trial by jury is "inviolate." See OHIO CONST. art. 1, § 5.
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otherwise-to subvert logic into a claim that the right does not exist-is
inconsistent with the establishment of the right to trial by jury. The very
statute which seeks to abolish the right recognizes that it has existed for
fifteen years. Thereafter, by slight of hand, the right to trial by jury is
transformed into a non-right. Appropriate application of the Seventh
Amendment should forbid such a result. Thus, a statute of repose is
inconsistent with the right to trial by jury.
C. Expansion of In Personam Jurisdiction
The third thread supporting recognition of an open courts right is the
underlying premise which has supported a steady expansion of in personam
jurisdiction since the territorial approach to jurisdiction was replaced with
the "minimum contacts" and "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice" of International Shoe Co. v. Washington.86 Due process demands
have been diluted to permit forums to assert jurisdiction in a substantial
number of cases where contacts with the forum state are highly limited.
This process has been made easier by adoption of long-arm statutes which
expressly or impliedly permit service of process upon non-residents to the
maximum extent allowed by due process.8 7  The underlying premise,
though rarely stated as such, is that a broad based ability to comport with
due process allows injured parties to access the courts in a meaningful
manner with minimum inconvenience.
This is not to say that due process has been effectively eliminated as a
limiting device. The Supreme Court has marked boundaries which prevent
forums from asserting jurisdiction when doing so serves needs too limited
to justify bringing a given defendant into a given court.88 On the other
86. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
87. Section 410.10 of California's Code of Civil Procedure provides that "[a] court
of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of
this state or of the United States." CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973); see R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 9-5-33 (1985). Ohio sets forth nine distinct events that can serve as a basis
for service of process, four of which are based on tortious action or injury. See OHiO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2307.382 (Anderson 1995). Recent decisions reflect a willingness to carefully
considerdue process implications when determining the validity of service under this statute.
For instance, limited contacts were deemed sufficient in a number of Ohio cases. See, e.g.,
Dynes Corp. v. Seikel, Koly & Co., 654 N.E.2d 991 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (providing and
overseeing a tax accountant); Pharmed Corp. v. Biologics, Inc., 646 N.E.2d 1167 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1994) (negotiation by mail and facsimile for sale of beds in Ohio). But see Sherry v.
Geissler U. Pehr GmBbH, 651 N.E.2d 1383 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (single sale of a winding
machine not sufficient for imposing personal jurisdiction).
88. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 480 U.S. 102 (1987) (placing
product in stream of commerce, in and of itself, insufficient to allow jurisdiction over a
Japanese company with no other contacts, even if this met minimum contacts as it was an
unreasonable assertion ofjurisdiction); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286 (1980) (permitting jurisdiction over the foreign manufacturer and its national importer
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hand, the states are permitted to assert jurisdiction where the factual nexus
to the forum is highly limited.
A leading example of such broad based compliance with the need for
minimum contacts, substantial justice, and fair play is McGee v. Internation-
al Life Ins. Co. 9 Here the defendant, a Texas insurance company, was
subject to jurisdiction in California despite limited contacts with that
State.9" The Court found that due process demands were met even though
only a single act or contract was involved because the "suit was based on
a contract which had substantial connection with [the state's courts]. ' '9'
In reaching this decision the Court recognized two essential realities.
First, "a trend is clearly discernible toward expanding the permissible scope
of state jurisdiction over foreign corporations and other nonresidents. 92
Second, "California has a manifest interest ih providing effective means of
redress for its residents when their insurers refuse to pay claims., 93 That
trend, despite occasional setbacks, continues unabated to the present day.
Moreover, another version of the redress statement is equally valid: Any
state has a manifest interest in providing effective means of redress for its
injured residents when those injuries are caused by product defects.
In product liability and tort litigation, the court-house door is often wide
open. More than thirty years ago, a state supreme court applied a "stream
of commerce" approach to permit suit against an Ohio valve manufactur-
er. 94 A valve was installed into a water heater in Pennsylvania and the
plaintiff purchased the unit in Illinois.95 The manufacturer benefitted from
transactions that took place in Illinois, and, therefore, "[a]s a general
proposition, if a corporation elects to sell its products for ultimate use in
another State, it is not unjust to hold it answerable there for any damage
caused by defects in those products."96  The Supreme Court, in both
World- Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson and Asahi Metal Industr, Co.
v. Superior Court, endorsed a "stream of commerce" theory as a means to
satisfy minimum contacts, even though, in both cases, other factors
necessitated a finding that due process precluded jurisdiction as to some
defendants. 97
while holding that due process was violated by the assertion ofjurisdiction over a retailer and
regional distributor).
89. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
90. Id. at 220-21.
91. Id. at 223.
92. Id. at 222.
93. Id. at 223.
94. Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761 (I1.
1961).
95. Id. at 764.
96. Id. at 766. A stream of commerce approach is consistent with policies that
support strict liability in tort.
97. See supra note 87. In Asahi, the Court found that jurisdiction could not be
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The continuing trend of expansive tort jurisdiction is reflected in recent
decisions of the First and Ninth Circuits. The First Circuit upheld
jurisdiction upon a foreign corporation that had no office or residence in the
state when a Massachusetts resident drowned in the corporation's Hong
Kong hotel swimming pool. 98 Applying a tripartite analysis based on the
relationship to forum-based activity, availment of the benefits and protectio-
ns of the forum state, and foreseeability, the court held that there was
compliance with the due process clause. 99 The defendant had negotiated
a contract with decedent's employers to provide a discount for its employees
and had other contacts with Massachusetts. 0() Nevertheless, the totality
of links to the state was minimal.'' The court's reasoning recognized the
importance of providing state residents with access to the courts: "Massachu-
setts has a strong interest in protecting its citizens from out-of-state
solicitations for goods or services that prove to be unsafe, and it also has an
interest in providing its citizens with a convenient forum in which to assert
their clains."' 
0
As in McGee, this decision recognizes the importance of providing a
forum, of providing access to the court to seek a remedy. The jurisdictional
prerequisites necessary to comport with due process are minimal because the
courts must be open.
The Supreme Court has recognized an open courts component of due
process and equal protection in both criminal and civil contexts. Effectua-
tion of the penumbra of the Seventh Amendment commands a similar result.
Such a result is also consistent with the broadening base of due process to
support the exercise of personal jurisdiction. It is time to recognize the
existence of a federal open courts right sufficient to address and negate a
statute of repose so as to destroy the unfair policy encapsulated in it." 3
asserted in an indemnity action by a Taiwanese tire manufacturer against a Japanese
component part supplier. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 116.
98. Nowak v. Tak How lnvs., Ltd., 94 F.3d 708, 711 (Ist Cir. 1996).
99. Id. at 720-21.
100. Id. at 711.
101. Id. at 713-16 (summarizing the court's analysis and description of defendants'
contacts with the forum state).
102. Id. at 718 (emphasis added) (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.
462, 463 (1985)); see also Gordy v. Daily News, L.P., 95 F.3d 829 (9th Cir. 1996)
(upholding jurisdiction in California for the libel of a California resident by a New York
newspaper that did not solicit in the state and where its total California circulation was 13
daily and 18 Sunday newspapers while 99% of its total circulation took place within 300
miles of the New York metropolitan area).
103. These threads can be further strengthened by consideration of the rights
maintained through the Ninth Amendment, the First Amendment guarantee of the right to
petition for grievances, and the Privileges and Immunity Clause of the Constitution. U.S.
CONST. art. IV, § 2. For example, in Canadian Northern Railway' Co. v. Eggan, 252 U.S.
553 (1920), the Court recognized that the Privileges and Immunity Clause protected the right
of court access to non-residents. Id. at 560. The Court, however, permitted the forum state
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V. PREEMPTION-SPECIFIC CONCERNS
House Bill 956, Section 106 contains two provisions which are likely
to produce substantial difficulty.0 4 First, the repose provision of Section
106(b)(l) exempts toxic harm from its mandate.' °5  Second, Section
106(b)(2) provides that if an applicable state law requires filing during a
period that is shorter than the fifteen-year period of Section 106, that state's
law shall apply." 6 These provisions mean that (1) toxic tort litigation is
governed only by the statute of limitations provision set forth in Section
106(a), including its discovery rule; and (2) the broad preemption standard
of Section 102(a) and (b) is significantly modified. Although, the toxic tort
exception should be upheld, the preemption modification is problematic.
A. The Toxic Tort Exclusion
Operation of the toxic harm provision can have at least two manifesta-
tions. Where there is immediate harm arising from a toxic exposure, such
as respiratory or cardiac difficulty arising from exposure to acid fumes, an
action will have to be brought within two years of that occurrence. This is
consistent with standard statute of limitations principles and with the law
that will apply to all products within the purview of the Act. Where the
harm does not manifest immediately because a latency period exists prior to
symptom emergence,0 7 the discovery rule allows suit until, in the exercise
of reasonable care, a claimant should have discovered the harm and its
to apply a choice of law rule allowing application of a shorter statute period against non-
residents where the claim arose in another state. Id. at 561-62. The result was to allow
protection against forum shopping by non-residents. The national repose statute makes no
similar distinctions and serves no similar state interests.
104. See H.R. 956, 104th Cong. (1996). That the repose provision applies only to
durable goods should present no difficulty in terms of policy or constitutional law. The
definition and application of the term may cause some difficulty due to its incorporation of
the Internal Revenue Code. Id. § 101(7).
105. Id. § 106(b)(1).
106. Id. § 106(b)(2). The converse situation, extending the longer period specified
in the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, supra note 9, presents no difficulty.
107. Substantial latency periods are not aberrations in a world reliant on numerous
toxic substances in manufacturing, medicine, transportation, and other areas. Exposure to
asbestoscan lead to mesothelioma twenty years after exposure. Ingestion of diethylstilbestrol
(DES) by pregnant women led to vaginal carcinoma in their daughters, but the linkage was
not established for a considerable time thereafter. For example, in Borel v. FibreboardPaper
Products, 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974), the plaintiffs
exposure to asbestos began in 1936, but his diagnosis of asbestosis was made in 1969. Id.
at 1081-82. Similarly, in Collins v. Eli Lill' Co., 342 N.W.2d 37 (Wis. 1984), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 826 (1984), the plaintiff was born in 1958 and symptoms related to the effect of
her mother's ingestion of DES during pregnancy did not emerge until 1975. Id. at 41.
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cause. 10 8 This right will exist without a repose limitation. Provided that
the claimant files an action within the time allowed after discovery, that
claim can proceed. This is the only form of harm excluded by definition
from the fifteen-year repose provision. With limited exceptions, for product
related harm other than toxic harm, the claimant must bring suit within the
periods specified in both the statute of limitations provision of Section
106(a) and the repose period of Section 106(b).'0 9
The statutory exclusion of toxic harm is predicated on a product/injury
differentiation which meets constitutional muster. Toxic tort harm is distinct
from other product related harm and is virtually the only type of product
harm which can manifest after passage of a substantial period of time. Even
if a person is aware of exposure to a toxic substance, it would not -be
possible to bring suit prior to manifestation of harm."' In this respect the
governmental interest in permitting a reasonable time period during which
a party can seek compensation for harm is advanced. As no other form of
harm exhibits such latency period potential, the protection offered by this
classification is reasonable.'''
108. This language is more carefully drawn than a casual reading suggests. A
discovery rule predicated on a date at which plaintiff learned that injury "may be related to
exposure" was held unconstitutional because it allowed the bar to arise despite uncertainty.
Proper language demands the certainty of a "knowledge" based provision. Burgess v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 609 N.E.2d 140, 142-43 (Ohio 1993).
109. These exceptions are set forth in H.R. 956, 104th Cong. § 106(b)(3) (1996).
110. A suit alleging potential mesothelioma due to asbestos exposure would be
dismissed as premature and speculative. Cf Villari v. Terminix Int'l, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 727
(E.D. Pa. 1987) (allowing recovery for medical monitoring in a pesticide based action only
after a showing of present physical injury); Payton v. Abbot Lab., 437 N.E.2d 171 (Mass.
1982) (no cause of action for emotional distress due to enhanced risk of disease attributable
to DES); Heiner v. Moretuzzo, 652 N.E.2d 664 (Ohio 1995) (rejecting a cause of action for
negligent infliction of emotional distress allegedly caused by fear of a nonexistent peril after
plaintiff improperly advised that she was HIV positive); Seimon v. Becton Dickinson & Co.,
632 N.E.2d 603 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (product liability action for emotional distress against
a syringe manufacturer based on defective needle cap that allowed nurse to receive a needle
puncture wound creating fear of HIV exposure rejected for lack of evidence of actual
exposure); see generally Melissa Moore Thompson, Comment, Enhanced Risk of Disease
Claims: Limiting Recovery to Compensation For Loss, Not Chance, 72 N.C. L. REV. 453
(1994) (noting both the general rule proscribing recovery and various exceptions).
Ill. Two other exceptions built into the repose section are reasonable and appropriate.
Neither raises questions of constitutional dimension and both serve to protect the interests of
injured parties. Section 106(a)(2) provides that persons suffering from a legal disability may
bring suit within two years after the person ceases to have that disability. Section 106(3)(B)
gives effect to written express warranties as to safety or life expectancy of the product which
exceeds fifteen years. Although the "life expectancy" language may cause some difficulty
in application this should not be a major problem. The law should permit a product
manufacturer, when consistent with the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade
Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-12 (1975), to warrant a product for such
a time as the manufacturer believes appropriate. The Product Liability Act must give effect
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B. Selective Preemption
Congress created an exception to its express preemption provision'"
2
which gives product liability defendants the greatest possible protection
while prejudicing those injured by defective products. This exception
mandates that if state law contains a shorter repose period, that period shall
govern. Not only does this exception contradict the stated purpose of
providing uniform product liability laws," 3 it creates a potential for
multiple statutory periods. At least fourteen states already have product
liability repose statutes with time periods ranging from six to fifteen
years. "'
The diversity of time bars will have at least three significant effects.
First, a battle will be waged to determine whether repose statutes are
procedural or substantive for choice of law purposes. Second, it must be
determined whether such a bifurcation approach is consistent with current
law governing preemption. Third, the creation of such classes may raise a
to such warranties or the Act will, itself, create fraud.
112. Section 102 provides in applicable part:
(a) Preemption-
(1) In general.-This Act governs any product liability action brought in any State
or Federal court on any theory of harm caused by a product.
(b) Relationship to State Law.-This title supersedes State law only to the extent that
State law applies to an issue covered by this title. Any issue that is not governed by this
title, including any standard of liability applicable to a manufacturer, shall be governed
by otherwise applicable State or Federal law.
H.R. 956, 104th Cong. § 102(a), (b) (1996).
113. Congressional findings in Section 2(a) reflecting this need include:
(3) the rules of law governing product liability actions,. . . have evolved inconsistent-
ly within and among the States, resulting in a complex, contradictory, and uncertain
regime that is inequitable ... unduly burdens interstate commerce:
(8) because of the national scope of the problems created by the defects in the civil
justice system, it is not possible for the States to enact laws that fully and effectively
respond... :
(9) it is the constitutional role of the national government to remove barriers to
interstate commerce and protect due process rights.
Id. § 2(a).
These findings are echoed in Section 2(b)(1) indicating that the Act will aid in
"'establishingcertain uniform legal principles of product liability which provide a fair balance
among the interests of product users, manufacturers, and product sellers." Id. § 2(b)(1).
114. See Werber, supra note 4, at 1053-55 (collected statutes); Stephen J. Werber,
Ohio Tort Reform Versus the Ohio Constitution,69 TEMP. L. REV. 1155 (1996). In addition,
Ohio has enacted a product liability repose provision. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2305. 10(C) (Anderson 1995) (effective Jan. 27, 1997). The constitutionality of this statute
is highly questionable in light of the Ohio Supreme Court's holding in Brennanian v. R.M.L
Co., 639 N.E.2d 425 (Ohio 1994).
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serious conflict between equal protection mandates and the rights of the
states to establish their own laws.
Generally, a time period within which an action must be filed is deemed
procedural unless it is established as part of the right under consideration so
as to bar the right, not merely the remedy." 5  If deemed procedural,
forum shopping will begin in earnest. Plaintiffs will avoid states with
repose provisions of less than fifteen years so that suit will be brought in
other jurisdictions. As many manufacturing defendants transact business
across state lines and are well aware that their products can cause harm in
many states, jurisdiction over those defendants could be asserted in almost
any state. Absent a successful forun non conveniens motion, which is no
easy task, plaintiffs' choice of forum will stand." 6
To counter this result, a reprise of the argument utilized to defeat equal
protection concerns will come into play. The repose provision prevents the
cause of action from coming into existence and, therefore, it affects the right
rather than the remedy. This could make a repose statute substantive for
choice of law purposes which permits application of the foreign law
limitation. A number of courts have reached this result." 7 The national
repose statute, however, differs from state statutes in that it creates no rights.
The national Act seeks only to impose limitations on rights created under
state law as made clear by its definition of a product liability claim.'"
The national repose provision is not part of any state law creating a cause
of action. It should be characterized as procedural.
Even if found substantive, the forum state could reject a foreign repose
statute on public policy grounds because its bar can be deemed repugnant
to the right to seek a remedy." 9  The court in Beard v. JI. Case Co.' 21
115. SeegenerallySun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988); Bournais v. Atlantic
Maritime Co., 220 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1955); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§§ 142-43 (1971).
116. For example, an automotive design case against any of the domestic big three,
where the injured party resides in North Carolina and the accident took place in North
Carolina, could be brought in Michigan as North Carolina has a six year repose statute. See
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-50(6) (1996). The manufacturer's contacts with Michigan could
outweigh any purported inconvenience to non-party witnesses.
117. See, e.g., Beard v. J.1. Case Co., 823 F.2d 1095 (7th Cir. 1987); Menne v.
Celotex Corp., 722 F. Supp. 662 (D. Kan. 1989); White v. Winnebago Indus. Inc., 718 F.
Supp. 1429 (N.D. Iowa 1989).
118. Section 101(15) provides that "[t]he term 'product liability action' means acivil
action brought on any theory for harm caused by a product." H.R. 956, 104th Cong.
§ 101(15) (1996). As there is no federal common law of product liability other than in the
law of admiralty, East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986),
all such claims must be predicated on rights granted by existing state law.
119. See generallv Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198, 202 (1918) (wherein
Judge Cardozo recognized that a court could refuse to enforce a claim arising in another
jurisdiction which "would violate some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent
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avoided the need to do precisely this by construing a state borrowing statute
as applicable to statutes of limitations but not statutes of repose. This
construction was required because the court was convinced that had the
borrowing statute included the repose provision, forum law would have
required a determination that it was unconstitutional.' 21 The court con-
cluded that the action was not time-barred because:
Although Wisconsin's policy favoring the maintenance of actions is
strong, we recognize that it is not absolute. By enacting the borrowing
statute, the Wisconsin legislature has also acknowledged the importance of
accommodating the concerns of other states .... However, Wisconsin's
interest in providing a forum is more seriously implicated in this case,
because the plaintiffs may be denied any opportunity to litigate the merits
of their claims even though they promptly filed a complaint.
22
In the substantial number of states which have a similar open courts
provision, the same public policy issue will have to be addressed. Instead
of reducing transaction costs and easing the litigation process, this section
creates an entirely new set of complex legal issues that will require state by
state resolution with a strong potential for conflicting results.
There is a substantial likelihood that states with no repose statutes will
become the repository of otherwise remote claims. The national legislation
thus fails its primary goal-uniformity-in regard to this vital aspect of
litigation. States with no product liability repose statute had better brace for
the onslaught.
If an absence of uniformity and an increase in forum shopping with
consequent choice of law issues are not sufficient problems, the repose
provision will also face the challenge posed by its limitations and its
deference to state law. The fact that Congress can preempt in the field of
product liability is unquestionable. A wide ranging body of legislation has
already done so in regard to many significant product lines. In these areas
the question is not whether preemption is permitted, but the extent to which
conception of morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal"); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 90 (1971); see also Marchlik v. Coronet Ins. Co., 239
N.E.2d 799 (I11. 1968) (direct action statute); Lyons v. Turner Const. Co., 551 N.E.2d 1062
(I1l. App. 1990) (holding party harmless for its own negligence under a contract indemnifica-
tion agreement); Mertz v. Mertz, 3 N.E.2d 597 (N.Y. 1936) (interspousal immunity). But
see Alexander v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 952 F.2d 1215 (10th Cir. 1991) (foreign product
liability repose statute did not offend forum public policy).
120. 823 F.2d 1095 (7th Cir. 1987).
121. Id. at 1100-05. The forum state, Wisconsin, had a borrowing statute which
referenced foreign "periods of limitation." If this had included a statute of repose the action
would have been barred under otherwise applicable Tennessee law in contravention of
Wisconsin's Right to Remedy constitutional provision.
122. Id. at 1104-05.
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it has taken place. 23  The repose statute under consideration raises a
distinct question for which there is little guidance to aid in the framing of
a response.
Traditional preemption issues are well illustrated by decisions addressing
the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966124 which
focuses on one of the most important product areas. .Guidance and clarifica-
tion as to whether the absence of safety devices was actionable could have
been provided by the decision in Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick.'2 5 It was
not. The Court determined that a state tort action predicated on the absence
of an anti-locking braking system was neither expressly nor impliedly
preempted by the Act or by judicially suspended NHTSA Standard 121.126
The opinion's failure to provide adequate guidance to the lower courts is
reflected in the continued judicial attention given to the preemptive effect
of the statute and its regulations. 127
The most recent Supreme Court decision, Medronic, Inc. v. Lohr,'28
reveals a highly divided Court addressing the question of whether the
Medical Device Amendments preempted negligence or strict liability claims
arising from alleged defects in a pacemaker. The express preemption
language involved differed in substance, but not approach, from that of the
123. See e.g., Medronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240 (1996) (Medical Device
Amendments); New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1671 (1995) (Employee Retirement Income Security Act or "ERISA");
Freightliner Corp. v. Ben Myrick, 115 S. Ct. 1483 (1995) (National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act or "NTMVSA"); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992)
(cigarette labeling); English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72 (1990) (Energy Reorganization
Act).
124. 15 U.S.C. § 1381 (1996) (repealed).
125. 115 S. Ct. 1483 (1995).
126. Id. at 1487-88.
127. A substantial number of decisions relating to preemption claims predicated on the
absence of lap belts or air bags can be found in 24 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA 1996).
For example, Ohio appellate courts are divided. Compare Minton v. Honda of Am. Mfg.,
Inc., 2 Prods. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 14746 (air bag claim impliedly preempted) with Nelson
v. Ford Motor Co., 670 N.E.2d 307 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (air bag claim not preempted).
Reported decisions since Freightlineralso illustrate the conflict. See. e.g., Hernandez-Gomez
v. Leonardo, 917 P.2d 238 (Ariz. 1996) (en banc) (lap belt claim not preempted); Cellucci
v. General Motors Corp., 676 A.2d 253 (Pa. 1996) (air bag claim impliedly preempted).
Similar issues and conflicts arise in regard to other federal Acts. See, e.g., Goodwin v.
Bacon, 896 P.2d 673 (Wash. 1995) (en banc) (State claim of inadequate labeling preempted
by FIFRA's express clause found in 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) prohibiting "requirements for
labelling [sic] or packaging in addition to or different from that required under this Act.");
Gorton v. American Cyanamid Co., 533 N.W.2d 746 (Wis. 1995) (negligent misrepresenta-
tion claim not preempted by FIFRA).
128. 116 S. Ct. 2240 (1996),followedby Walker v. Johnson& Johnson Vision Prods.,
Inc., 552 N.W.2d 679 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996).
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repose statute.129 Part III of the plurality opinion, endorsed by a majority
of the Court, reiterated the standard of Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. 130
stating that interpretation of express preemption language need not go
beyond its language to ascertain congressional intent, but that the domain
preempted required identification.' 3' Moreover, absent a clear manifesta-
tion of intent, state law is not to be superseded. The focal point for
determination of the extent of preemption is congressional purpose.'
-32
The judgment of the Court was that the "requirement" language of the Act
did not preempt plaintiff's common law actions. 33  In reaching this
decision, emphasis was placed on the role of the Food & Drug Administra-
tion ("FDA") and the manner in which various exceptions to preemption
could be recognized by FDA action. 134
Nothing in the opinions addresses a congressional blanket recognition
of differing state regulations with no review by the executive branch.
Throughout the plurality opinion, emphasis is placed upon the wide
exemption power granted to the FDA.'35 The Court has no difficulty in
permitting Congress to establish a regulatory system which allows executive
branch discretion in regard to preemption. This discretion permits the
executive to assure compliance with governmental objectives and policy as
well as individual state needs.
The FDA regulations and any exemptions granted are all process based.
A specific determination is necessary in each instance. The FDA is
perceived as "uniquely qualified to determine whether a particular form of
state law 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress,' and, therefore, whether it should
129. The language, consistent with that of other federal Acts provides:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, no State or political subdivision
of a State may establish or continue in effect with respect to a device intended for
human use any requirement-
( 1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under this
chapter to the device, and
(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other matter
included in a requirement applicable to the device under this chapter.
21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1996).
130. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
131. Medronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2250 (quoting Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517).
132. Id. at 2250-51.
133. Id. at 2259.
134. Id. at 2255. Part V of the opinion, reflecting a majority position, recognized that:
"Congress explicitly delegated to the FDA the authority to exempt state regulations from the
pre-emptive effect of the MDA-an authority that necessarily requires the FDA to assess the
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be pre-empted.' ', 3 6  The repose provision allows no discretion. Rather,
Congress has decided that conflicting state law will not be preempted
provided that the state law is harsher than its federal counterpart. In at least
two other Acts, Congress has permitted states to impose stricter standards
than a federal preemptive statute. 37 In both, the deference to state law
permitted different substantive law and regulation to better protect or benefit
the public. In neither did the legislation bear upon the time within which
an action had to be brought.
In taking this approach, Congress paradoxically promotes conflicting
objectives. Section 102 was carefully drawn to advance the purpose of
uniformity in the law. Various substantive provisions of House Bill 956
achieve this goal. 3 1 In doing so they are consistent with various findings
that support the need for a national Act. Section 106, however, advances
a lack of uniformity and is inconsistent with the findings that support the
need for the Act. Section 106 serves only the objective of terminating the
rights of injured parties.
A possible outcome is that the courts will enforce Section 102 as written
but find Section 106(2) invalid. Whether this determination is predicated
on equal protection, due process, or an open courts approach is irrelevant.
What is relevant is that this exception to preemption cries out for such an
outcome. The exception allowing application of shorter state repose
provisions is mean spirited, ineffective in the vast majority of cases, and not
worth the litigation it will spawn.
The third concern is one of potentially serious constitutional magnitude.
The interplay between the Fourteenth and Tenth Amendments may become
a focus of the courts and constitutional scholars. By limiting the preemptive
effect of the repose provision, Congress has changed the preemption game.
There is nothing novel about the concept of partial preemption by which
Congress permits consistent state substantive law to remain in effect.39
In each of these instances, the state law involved is substantive or regulatory
in nature.
136. Id. at 2255 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
137. Port and Tanker Safety Act of 1978, 33 U.S.C. § 1225 (1988 & Supp. V 1994);
The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. § 3432 (1994).
138. Key substantive sections which contain no exception for application of state law
include Section 104 establishing a substance abuse defense, Section 105 mandating uniform
laws for misuse and alteration of products and resolving the need for uniformity in the
treatment of workplace injury related product claims with further modification through
Section 111, and Section 110 regulating the law of joint and several liability. Cf Section
108's limited preemption regarding punitive damages which creates issues similar to those
of the repose provision, i.e., whether the ceiling on damages is constitutional and whether
allowing harsher state law is valid.
139. See JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, FEDERAL PREEMPTION: THE SILENT REVOLUTION Ch.
V (1991).
1997]
HeinOnline  -- 64 Tenn. L. Rev. 789 1996-1997
TENNESSEE LA W REVIEW
No prior federal Act seems to utilize a partial preemption in regard to
a statute of repose. Although permitting the application of a harsher rule is
consistent with limited congressional precedent, it would not serve the same
purpose: as those prior legislative precedents. In the prior Acts, the
allowance of a stricter standard advanced a goal of protecting the public.
In the case of a statute of repose, application of the harsher standard
deprives the consumer of protection in regard to the safety of goods
marketed and compensation for injury sustained.
A new question now comes into play: Does the Supremacy Clause allow
for this form of partial preemption when doing so creates diverse classes of
injured parties who will gain or lose rights based solely on which of
multiple repose statutes is applicable? Certainly, each state is free to set its
own repose standard and is equally free not to set such a standard.
Assuming constitutionality, the federal government is free to remove this
right by exercise of its interstate commerce power and creation of a national
repose statute applicable to all product liability claims. Query: Can that
government, consistent with the Constitution, declare that: (1) there is a
federal limit of fifteen years, but (2) any state is free to set a shorter limit?
The most likely response is affirmative. This approach maximizes the
protection afforded to manufacturers and others in the chain of product
distribution. Congress appears to see this as a means of imparting greater
fairness to the system. Under a rational basis analysis, this will likely
suffice to support the state line based classification, and comport with equal
protection, as it is consistent with the purpose of "establishing greater
fairness, rationality, and predictability in the civil justice system."' 40 This
approach also permits the states to exercise their power in an area that is
traditionally one of state concern. That the entire repose statute is ill-
advised, and that the additional harshness of this provision exacerbates the
problem, reflects on congressional wisdom and judgment rather than
constitutionality.
VI. CONCLUSION
Any statute of repose raises questions of constitutional dimension.
Although a national repose statute may survive constitutional scrutiny,
enactment of such a statute is unnecessary and ill-advised. In the form
enacted by Congress, the fifteen-year repose period fails to serve the
purposes of the Common Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act on
several levels. First, it is of such a limited application as to have no
substantial effect upon the number of product liability cases that will be
filed. Reduction of the number of cases filed is far better served by other
substantive provisions of the same Act. Second, by allowing application of
140. H.R. 956, 104th Cong. § 2(b)(5) (1996).
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shorter state repose statutes, the objective of uniformity is defeated, forum
shopping is encouraged, and constitutional concerns are raised.
From the traditional perspective of the objectives of any statute of
limitations, this statute of repose adds little to the benefits of the general
statute of limitations contained in the Act. A two year limitation period,
coupled with a discovery rule, provides adequate protection to product
liability defendants while permitting injured consumers an opportunity to
seek fair compensation. The potential for loss of witnesses with the passage
of time is real, but this will have a far more detrimental effect upon
plaintiffs than upon defendants. Product liability defendants, taking
advantage of modem technology, will be able to defend the integrity of their
products regardless of when suit is brought. Plaintiffs, who may no longer
have the product involved and require the assistance of eyewitnesses and the
"human" element in' the litigation process, are far more likely to suffer
through the passage of time.
The minimal advantage that a repose statute may provide to manufactur-
ers and other product liability defendants is outweighed by the harm it
creates. The harm is found in the increase of transaction litigation costs that
will surround enforcement of the section for years to come and in the abject
attack such a statute makes upon basic principles of fairness. Thus, a
"common sense" effort at reform is needed. The repose statute lacks such
common sense and should be repudiated. Repudiation will have the
additional benefit of increasing the likelihood of enactment of necessary
national product liability reform.
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